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Yakov Babichenko∗ Siddharth Barman†
Abstract
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining cor-
related equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which
an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players’ util-
ities at pure action profiles. In this model we establish that in order
to compute a correlated equilibrium any deterministic algorithm must
query the black box an exponential (in n) number of times.
1 Introduction
Equilibria are fundamental constructs in game theory that formally specify po-
tential outcomes in strategic settings. Nash equilibrium [17] and its generaliza-
tion, correlated equilibrium [1, 2], are arguably the two most well-established
examples of such notions of rationality. Both of these concepts denote distri-
butions over strategies of players at which no player could benefit by unilateral
deviation. What distinguishes these constructs is the fact that mixed Nash
equilibrium is defined to be a product of independent distributions (one of
every player), whereas a correlated equilibrium is a general (joint) probability
distribution over the strategy space.
Questions related to the complexity of determining equilibria have been
a driving force behind research at the intersection of computer science and
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After the completion of this result we became aware of a recent and independent work
by Hart and Nisan [13] that generalizes the result presented in this paper. In particular,
Hart and Nisan [13] establish query complexity lower bounds for randomized algorithms and
computing approximate equilibria; for a discussion of this work see Section 4.2.
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economics. Recent results imply that it is unlikely that there exists an efficient
algorithm for determining mixed Nash equilibrium, even in the two-player case
(see [9, 5, 3]). On the other hand, given a fixed number of players n and and at
most m actions for every player, a correlated equilibrium can be computed in
time polynomial in m; since, correlated equilibria can be specified via a linear
feasibility program with O(nm2) linear inequalities over O(mn) variables. But,
this leaves open a natural question of whether there exists an efficient algorithm
that determines a correlated equilibrium even if the number of players is large.
In this paper we address this question.
Note that if the game is specified in normal form (i.e., the utilities of all
the players at every action profile in the game is given to the algorithm) then
the input size itself is exponential in n; but, our objective is to determine if a
correlated equilibrium can be computed in time polynomial in n. A standard
approach to deal with such scenarios is to assume that the game is specified
via a black box. The algorithm may query the black box about the game, and
receive answers in O(1) time (or in poly(n,m) time).
The core modeling question is which type of queries can the black box an-
swer? An probable model is one in which every query is a product distribution
over strategies, x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) (i.e., a mixed action profile), and the black
box returns the expected value of the utilities of the players, (Es∼x[ui(s)])i, as
an answer. Such a model is applicable if the game has a succinct representation
(see [15]); since, in such a case the expected utility of each player can be com-
puted in poly(n,m) time for every mixed action profile. For such a querying
model, building upon the work of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [18], Jiang
and Leyton-Brown [15] proved that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
for computing exact correlated equilibrium. In particular, polynomial (in n
and m) number of queries are required in this model.
But, for general games it is not always reasonable to assume that such a
black box exists. The support of a mixed action profile may be exponential
in n; therefore, the existence of a black box, which aggregates over those
exponential number of outcomes, is a strong assumption.
A more applicative model is one in which the queries are pure-action pro-
files (i.e., queries are of the form (s1, s2, . . . , sn), where si is a specific strategy
of player i) and the black box returns the utilities of players at those profiles.
For example, in a repeated-game framework [12] where players do not know
the game, they observe the outcome of the realized pure action even if they
played a mixed strategy. It might seem that the model is too weak for effi-
ciently computing a correlated equilibrium, because only a very small fraction
of the game is known after a polynomial number of queries. But, surprisingly,
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it turns out that an approximate correlated equilibrium1 can be computed us-
ing such a black box in polynomial time. This can be done using procedures–in
particular, regret-minimizing dynamic–developed in [10], [7], and [16]. These
dynamics converge to an approximate correlated equilibrium in polynomial
number of steps.
Another observation that brings up the applicability of the pure-action-
query model is as follows: in every game there exists a correlated equilibria
with polynomial-sized support (e.g., [8]). This is because correlated equilibria
are defined by a polynomial (specifically, O(nm2)) number of linear inequal-
ities, therefore, a basic feasible solution of such a linear feasibility program
will have a polynomial number of non-zero entries. In addition, using only
pure-action queries we can efficiently verify whether a probability distribution
with polynomial-sized support is a correlated equilibrium or not.
Hence, in this context, it is natural to ask if an exact correlated equilibrium
can be computed in polynomial time using pure-action queries. This was an
open question posed by Sergiu Hart [11].
In this paper we answer this question in the negative: the number of pure-
action queries that are required to find an exact correlated equilibrium is expo-
nential in n, even for games with two actions per player. This result shows that
the algorithms in [18] and [15] that use mixed-action queries (i.e., a succinct
representation of the game) are the best possible, in the sense that if we can
evaluate utilities only at pure-action profiles and not at mixed-action profiles
then a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that computes a correlated
equilibrium does not exist.
We note that similar black-box models have been previously considered
by Hirsch et al. [14] and Fernley et al. [6] in the context of determining fixed
points and Nash equilibrium respectively.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
We consider games with n players, two actions {0, 1} per player, and a utility
function ui : {0, 1}n → R for every player i ∈ [n]. We will use V := {0, 1}n to
denote the set of pure actions in the game, and also the set of vertices in the
n-dimensional hypercube Hn. For s ∈ V , we denote by s¬i := (s1, ..., si−1, 1−
si, si+1, ..., sn) the neighbor of s in the hypercube obtained by switching the
1A probability distribution σ over the players’ strategies is said to be an approximate ()
correlated equilibrium if for any player unilaterally deviating from strategies drawn from σ
increases utility, in expectation, by at most .
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ith coordinate. Write di(s) = ui(s)−ui(s¬i) for the difference 2 in the utilities
of player i if she switches her action. Finally, let d(s) := (di(s))
n
i=1 denote the
vector of differences, and D(s) :=
∑
i di(s) be the sum of those differences.
In a binary-action game, a correlated equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A (joint) probability distribution σ over {0, 1}n is a correlated
equilibrium if for every player i and action si ∈ {0, 1} we have∑
s−i
[ui(si, s−i)− ui(1− si, s−i)]σ(si, s−i) ≥ 0,
where s−i denotes the strategies chosen by players other than i.
We write s = (si, s−i) and use the definition of di(s) to get
Es∼σ[di(s)] =
∑
si
∑
s−i
[ui(si, s−i)− ui(1− si, s−i)]σ(si, s−i).
Therefore, if σ is a correlated equilibrium then the following holds for every
player i
Es∼σ[di(s)] ≥ 0. (1)
Note that inequality (1) is a necessary condition for σ to be a correlated
equilibrium, it is not sufficient.
Remark 1. Given distribution σ, if Es∼σ[D(s)] < 0 then there exists player i
such that Es∼σ[di(s)] < 0. Hence, any distribution that satisfies Es∼σ[D(s)] <
0 cannot be a correlated equilibrium.
We will also consider coarse correlated equilibrium meaning probability
distributions pi over strategy profiles that satisfy
Es∼pi[ui(s)] ≥ Es∼pi[ui(s′i, s−i)],
for every player i and strategy profile s′i in i’s action set (which in general
can contain more than two actions). A coarse correlated equilibrium is a
generalization of correlated equilibrium in which a player’s deviation (s′i) is
committed to in advance and independent of the sampled strategy profile (s).
Coarse correlated equilibria are sometimes called the Hannan set, e.g., see [20].
Remark 2. In binary-action games the set of correlated equilibria coincides
with the set of coarse correlated equilibria.
2Note that di(s) is negative of the standard regret. We use it instead of regret for ease
of exposition.
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To prove our result we will need the following giant-component lemma over
hypercubes. For subsets S, T ⊆ V we denote by δ(S, T ) the set of edges in the
hypercube Hn that connect S and T .
Lemma 1. For any subset of vertices S ⊂ V of cardinality less than 2n
n2+1
, the
number of vertices in the largest connected component of V \S is greater than
2n−1.
Proof. We denote the edge expansion of the hypercube by h(Hn). That is,
h(Hn) := min
T⊂V
|δ(T, V \ T )|
min{|T |, |V \ T |}
Since the second-largest eigenvalue of the hypercube is 1− 2
n
(see, e.g., [19]),
using Cheeger’s inequality (see, e.g., [4]) we get that h(Hn) ≥ 1/n. Therefore,
for any C ⊂ V we have
|δ(C, V \ C)| ≥ 1
n
min{|C|, |V \ C|}. (2)
Say we are given an S ⊂ V that satisfies |S| < 2n
n2+1
. Denote by C1, ..., Ck
the connected component of V \ S. Assume for contradiction that all the
connected components satisfy |Ck| ≤ 2n−1, then |Ck| = min{|Ck|, |V \ Ck|}.
Since all the edges from Ck to V \ Ck must end up in S (and not in other
connected components), there are at least∑
k
|Ck|
n
>
1
n
2n
(
1− 1
n2 + 1
)
=
1
n
2n
(
n2
n2 + 1
)
(3)
incoming edges into S, which implies that there are at least 1
n2
2n( n
2
n2+1
) vertices
in S (because every vertex has at most n incoming edges), which contradicts
the assumption on the size of S.
3 Lower Bound
Our main result is as follows:
Theorem 1. Let A be a deterministic algorithm that, for any n-player binary-
action game G, determines a correlated equilibrium after asking q pure-action
queries. Then q ≥ 2n
n2+1
.
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This is in contrast to mixed-action queries where q = poly(n,m) suf-
fices [18, 15] . This is also in contrast to probabilistic regret-minimizing dy-
namics (e.g., regret matching [10]) that determine correlated ε-equilibrium
using poly(n,m, 1
ε
) pure action queries.
We get the following corollary from Remark 2.
Corollary 1. Let A be a deterministic algorithm that, for any n-player binary-
action game G, determines a coarse correlated equilibrium after asking q pure-
action queries. Then q ≥ 2n
n2+1
.
Proof of Thoerem 1. The high-level argument behind the result is that if we
are given subexponentially many strategy profiles (i.e., vertices of the hyper-
cube), one after the other, then we can adaptively set utilities at these profiles
such that no correlated equilibrium can be constructed using them. To de-
velop some intuition as to how we accomplish this construction, say Q is the
set of queried (pure) action profiles and we set the utilities such that the sum
of difference values, D(s), is equal to −1 for all s ∈ Q. Then by Remark 1,
there does not exist a correlated equilibrium σ whose support is contained in
Q. The querying algorithm might use strategy profiles that are not in Q, but
the fact that the utilities at these strategies is unknown to the algorithm lets
us ensure that any proposed distribution is not a correlated equilibrium.
As stated above, a key element for us is an adaptive process that given a
sequence of strategy profiles sets utilities such that D(s) is negative at every
queried strategy. We model this as a multi-round interaction between a querier
(surrogate for the deterministic algorithm) and an adversary (representing the
black box). In each round, the querier sends in a strategy profile s to the
adversary which in turn returns a vector of differences d(s). Note that in a
binary-action game the vector d(s) must satisfy the constraint
di(s¬i) = −di(s) (4)
for every player i. And those are the only constraints on the difference vectors
d(s) in the game. Hence the adversary needs to ensure that the returned
vectors satisfy the complementarity constraint (4).
It is worth mentioning that unlike the black box the adversary is designed
to return difference values, d(s). But, this does not reduce the applicability
of the interaction model. Given that the adversary returns difference values
that satisfy property (4) for queried strategy profiles s, we can set utilities, at
s and its neighbors (specifically ui at s¬i for all i), that match the difference
values reported by the adversary. These utilities can then be considered as the
response of the black box at s.
6
Wt+1
R = Wt \Wt+1
V \Wt
T
qt+1 v
Figure 1: The figure demonstrates the recursive definition of Wt+1 from Wt
when the queried vertex is qt+1. The figure also depicts the construction of
the tree T .
Let Qt ⊂ V be the set of queries that the querier asks in first t rounds.
We define Wt ⊂ V to be the largest connected component of V \ Qt. Note
that, either Wt+1 ⊆ Wt or Wt+1 ∩Wt = ∅. But, for any t < 2nn2+1 , the second
relation cannot hold, because |Wt+1|, |Wt| > 2n−1 by Lemma 1. Therefore, for
all t < 2
n
n2+1
, we have Wt+1 ⊆ Wt.
As the interaction continues, the adversary will progressively assign differ-
ence values d(s) that satisfy constraint (4). For all t, the adversary maintains
the following three properties for Wt:
(P1) For every s /∈ Wt, all the components of d(s) have already been assigned
a value, i.e., vector d(s) is completely defined, and D(s) = −1.
(P2) For every edge (s, s¬i) such that s, s¬i ∈ Wt the difference values di(s)
and di(s¬i) are unassigned, in other words, these values have not been
set so far.
(P3) Every vertex s /∈ Wt that has an edge into Wt satisfies s ∈ Qt (this
property will implicitly hold since Wt is an entire connected component
in V \Qt).
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At time t + 1 the adversary assigns vectors d(s) for every vertex s ∈ Wt \
Wt+1 as follows.
Denote R = Wt \ Wt+1. R is the set of vertices that got disconnected
from Wt because some vertex, say qt+1, got queried. That is, removing qt+1
disconnected Wt (see Figure 3). In general, R might contain other vertices
besides qt+1. Nonetheless, R has to be a connected set of vertices. Let v ∈ Wt+1
be a neighbor of qt+1—if Wt gets disconnected by removing qt+1 then such a
vertex must exist. By construction, the vertex set R ∪ {v} forms a connected
component (see Figure 3). Write T to denote some spanning tree of R ∪ {v}.
We root the tree T at v and define vectors d(s) for every s ∈ R in a bottom-up
manner: from the leafs to the root.
Given a leaf s with the edge (s, s¬i) in T (i.e., s¬i is the parent of s in
T ), we know by property (P2) that so far we have not assigned a value to
di(s). Moreover, this holds for all edges out of s that end in R. Write index
set J = {j | s¬j ∈ R}. By (P2) we are free to to assign values to dj(s) and
dj(s¬j). For j ∈ J \ {i}, we set dj(s) = dj(s¬j) = 0, and finally assign
di(s) = −
∑
k 6=i
dk(s)− 1, (5)
and di(s¬i) = −di(s). Such an assignment ensures that constraints (4) are
satisfied for all defined values. Once values for s have been assigned, we
remove it from consideration and recurse over T .
Using this procedure, (5) guarantees that property (P1) is maintained; in
particular, D(s) = −1 for all s ∈ R. In addition, since we did not assign
difference di(s) along any edge (s, s¬i) such that s, s¬i ∈ Wt+1, property (P2)
is maintained as well.
As stated above, property (P3) holds because no vertex in R \ {qt+1} is
directly connected to Wt+1.
Overall, say, the querier submits q queries to the adversary with q < 2
n
(n2+1)
.
After the q queries have been processed by the adversary we split V into three
sets:
(1) F := V \Wq. This is the set of (fully assigned) vertices, s, for which
all the components of the difference vector, d(s), have been assigned a value.
Also, by construction, for such s we have the sum of differences D(s) = −1.
(2) P := {s ∈ Wq | there exists a neighbor of s in F}. These are vertices,
s, with a partial assignment. That is, some of the components of the difference
vector d(s) have been assigned a value. Such a partial assignment follows from
the fact that we must have fixed the difference values for several neighbors of
s (but not for all of them, otherwise s will belong to F ).
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(3) N := V \ (F ∪P ). These are the vertices with no assignments. In other
words, for all s ∈ N , the entire vector d(s) is unassigned.
By Lemma 1 we know that |Wq| > 2n−1, since Wq is the largest connected
component of the graph V \ Qq. Therefore |F | < 2n−1. By property (P3) we
know that all the vertices in P are neighbors of Qq, therefore |P | ≤ n|Qq| ≤
n
n2+1
2n, therefore
|N | ≥
(
1− 1
2
− n
n2 + 1
)
2n ≥ 1
3
2n. (6)
The last inequality holds for all n ≥ 6.
Denote by x the probability distribution over V that the querier submits
after the q queries. For subset S ⊂ V , write x(S) to denote the cumulative
probability of vertices in S, x(S) :=
∑
s∈S x(s).
The adversary will complete the remaining utilities in the game using the
following rules. We will show that these rules guarantee that x is not a cor-
related equilibrium. In other words, the adversary can always ensure that
output generated by the querier is not a correlated equilibrium.
Case 1: x(N) ≤ 1/6. In such a case, by inequality (6), there exists an
action v ∈ N such that x(v) ≤ 1
2
2−n. The adversary constructs a spanning
tree that contains all the vertices Wq with the root v. Now, using the same
bottom-up assignment procedure that we described before, the adversary sets
the difference values for s ∈ Wq such that D(s) = −1 for all s 6= v. Note that
this implies that D(v) = 2n − 1, since ∑s∈V D(s) = 0. Now we have
Es∼x[D(s)] ≤ 1
2
2−nD(v) +
(
1− 1
2
2−n
)
(−1) < −1
2
+
1
2
2−n < 0. (7)
By Remark 1 we get that x is not a correlated equilibrium.
Case 2: x(N) > 1/6. Denote by M the maximal (difference) value that
was assigned by the adversary during the q queries. Recall that for strategy
profiles s ∈ N difference values di(s), for all i, are unassigned. We leverage
this freedom and set these difference values such that some player, say p, has
an incentive to deviate to one of the strategies 0 or 1. This will imply that x
is not a correlated equilibrium.
For j = 0, 1 we denote by Nj the set actions in N where player p plays
action j, Nj := {s ∈ N | sp = j}. One of the sets N0, N1 satisfies x(Nj) ≥ 112 .
Without loss of generality, say x(N0) ≥ 112 . The adversary sets dp(s) = −12M
for every s ∈ N0 and then, following equation (4), sets dp for s¬p ∈ N1. All
the remaining unassigned difference values are set to zero.
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Now, for the action sp = 0 we have∑
s−p
[dp(sp, s−p)]x(sp, s−p) ≤ 11
12
M +
1
12
(−12M) < 0 (8)
This implies that Definition 1 does not hold for the proposed distribution x,
and hence it is not a correlated equilibrium.
4 Discussion
4.1 The Tightness of the Result by Jiang and Leyton-
Brown [15]
Using the ellipsoid-against-hope algorithm (see also [18]) Jiang and Leyton-
Brown reduced the problem of computing correlated equilibrium in n-player
games for each player into the following problem.
Reduced problem3 : We are given a game with n players, 2 actions per
player, and a vector y ∈ Rn+. The goal is to determine a pure action profile s
such that yTd(s) > 0, where d(s) is the vector of differences at s.
In the proof of Theorem 1 we show that in the pure-action-query model,
if an algorithm, after submitting a sub-exponential number of queries, is un-
able to determine a pure-action profiles, s, for which
∑
i di(s) > 0 then the
algorithm can not produce a correlated equilibrium. The sum,
∑
i di(s), corre-
sponds to the reduced problem with y = (1, 1, ..., 1). In this sense, solving the
reduced problem is necessary for determining a correlated equilibrium. Note
that, by scaling the utilities, we can extend the same arguments to prove the
necessity of the reduced problem for any vector y ∈ Rn+.
Overall, in the pure actions query model, the problem of computing cor-
related equilibrium is equivalent to the reduced problem. The result of Jiang
and Leyton-Brown [15] establishes that in order to compute a correlated equi-
librium in polynomial time it is sufficient to solve the reduced problem in
polynomial time. On the other hand, if there exists a vector y for which the
reduced problem cannot be solved efficiently, then the arguments presented in
this paper prove that a correlated equilibrium cannot be efficiently determined.
3For ease of exposition, we state the problem only for binary-action games. The for-
mulation in [15] is for m-action games, with m ≥ 2, and can be obtained by appropriately
increasing the dimension of the involved vectors.
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4.2 The Result of Hart and Nisan [13]
We show that in the pure-action-query model, there is no polynomial time
deterministic algorithm for computing exact correlated equilibrium. Whereas,
regret-minimizing dynamics give us a polynomial-time randomized algorithm
for computing approximate correlated equilibrium. In order to complete the
picture one should answer the following two questions in this pure-action-
query model: (i) Does there exist a polynomial time deterministic algorithm
for computing approximate correlated equilibrium?; (ii) Can a polynomial-time
randomized algorithm compute an exact correlated equilibrium?
Hart and Nisan [13] show that the answer to both of these questions is
negative.
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